🌐 This post is published in English, Arabic, Chinese, and Turkish to support cross-regional understanding of Syria’s transitional dynamics and the strategic relevance of moderate opposition actors.

🇺🇸 English

In the aftermath of Bashar al-Assad’s fall, Syria’s battlefield has quieted—but its ideological war is far from over. While jihadist factions consolidate power in Idlib and northern corridors, the country’s moderate opposition remains fractured, forgotten, and dangerously underreported.

Jamal Maarouf, former commander of the Syrian Revolutionaries Front (SRF), has resurfaced in SDF-controlled northeastern Syria. His journey—from construction worker in Deir Sunbul to CIA-vetted rebel leader and now quiet exile—mirrors the rise and abandonment of Syria’s secular resistance.

Meanwhile, the 70th Division (Al-Tanf Forces)—formerly the Syrian Free Army—has evolved into a stabilizing force within Syria’s transitional government. Operating from the Al-Tanf Garrison, they assist in infrastructure repair, agricultural support, and civil coordination.

To counter jihadist entrenchment and stabilize Syria’s future, the secular opposition must be reactivated, documented, and elevated. Jamal Maarouf and the 70th Division represent the spine of that effort.

🇸🇾 العربية

استعادة الإرث المعتدل لسوريا: جمال معروف، جبهة ثوار سوريا، وصعود الفرقة 70

في أعقاب سقوط نظام بشار الأسد، هدأت المعارك في سوريا، لكن الحرب الأيديولوجية لا تزال مشتعلة. وبينما تواصل الفصائل الجهادية ترسيخ سيطرتها في إدلب وشمال البلاد، تبقى المعارضة المعتدلة ممزقة، منسية، وخارج التغطية الإعلامية.

جمال معروف، القائد السابق لجبهة ثوار سوريا، عاد للظهور في شمال شرق سوريا تحت سيطرة قوات سوريا الديمقراطية. أما الفرقة 70 (سابقًا جيش سوريا الحر)، فقد تحولت إلى قوة مؤسسية تعمل ضمن الحكومة الانتقالية الجديدة، وتشارك في إصلاح البنية التحتية، تأمين الآبار، والتنسيق مع وزارات الزراعة والدفاع.

إن إعادة تفعيل الشبكات المعتدلة، وتوثيق الأعمال الرمزية للعدالة، وبناء تحالفات عابرة للطوائف، كلها خطوات ضرورية لمواجهة هيمنة السرد الجهادي. سوريا تحتاج إلى معارضة علمانية موحدة، لا كحنين إلى الماضي، بل كضرورة استراتيجية.

🇨🇳 简体中文

重塑叙利亚温和派的遗产：贾迈勒·马鲁夫、叙利亚革命者阵线与第70师的崛起

在巴沙尔·阿萨德政权垮台之后，叙利亚的战场虽然趋于平静，但意识形态的斗争仍在继续。圣战组织在伊德利卜和北部地区巩固势力，而温和反对派却四分五裂，被边缘化，鲜有报道。

贾迈勒·马鲁夫，叙利亚革命者阵线（SRF）前指挥官，现已悄然出现在叙利亚东北部的叙利亚民主力量（SDF）控制区。而第70师（前叙利亚自由军）则已转型为新政府的支柱力量，参与农业、水利和安全事务，成为跨国治理的关键节点。

重建世俗反对派、激活温和网络、记录象征性正义行动，是对抗极端主义叙事、稳定叙利亚未来的战略必需。

🇹🇷 Türkçe

Suriye’nin Ilımlı Mirasını Geri Kazanmak: Cemal Maruf, SRF ve 70. Tümenin Yükselişi

Beşar Esad’ın düşüşünün ardından Suriye’deki çatışmalar azaldı, ancak ideolojik savaş hâlâ sürüyor. Cihatçı gruplar İdlib ve kuzeydeki bölgelerde hâkimiyet kurarken, ılımlı muhalefet dağılmış, unutulmuş ve medya radarının dışında kalmış durumda.

Cemal Maruf, Suriye Devrimciler Cephesi’nin (SRF) eski lideri, şu anda Suriye Demokratik Güçleri’nin kontrolündeki kuzeydoğu Suriye’de sessizce varlık gösteriyor. Öte yandan, 70. Tümen (eski adıyla Özgür Suriye Ordusu), yeni geçiş hükümetiyle koordinasyon içinde altyapı onarımları, güvenlik ve tarım desteği gibi görevler üstlenerek kurumsal bir aktöre dönüşmüş durumda.

Ilımlı ağların yeniden canlandırılması, sembolik adalet eylemlerinin belgelenmesi ve mezhepler arası ittifakların kurulması, cihatçı anlatıya karşı koymak ve Suriye’nin geleceğini istikrara kavuşturmak için stratejik bir zorunluluktur.

As someone who was tasked with writing the local rules for ECF filings in the federal court where I practiced — and whose late brother oversaw DOJ FISA court proceedings — I’ve seen firsthand both the strength and fragility of our judicial infrastructure.

The recent breach of the federal court filing system, now suspected to be the work of Russian intelligence, is more than a technical failure. It’s a strategic exploitation of procedural asymmetry.

🔍 What Happened:

Sealed records were compromised across multiple jurisdictions, including South Dakota, Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, and Arkansas — courts with fewer resources and less hardened protocols.

The attackers targeted midlevel criminal cases with overseas ties, some involving individuals with Russian and Eastern European surnames.

Sensitive filings were removed from PACER and stored on separate drives. Judges were issued burner phones and barred from accessing systems while abroad.

🧠 Why It Matters: Each federal court operates under its own local rules. That compartmentalization can be a strength — insulating sophisticated courts like SDNY and D.C. — but it also leaves rural courts exposed. The breach exploited those seams.

🔐 What We Must Learn:

Digital convenience must never outpace security.

Procedural fragmentation is a vulnerability adversaries will continue to exploit.

Legacy systems — like physical safes and hand-delivered filings — may be our last line of defense.

This isn’t just a breach. It’s a warning. And for those of us who’ve helped build the system from the inside, it’s personal.

Step-by-Step: Enrichment from 60% to 90%

1. Feedstock The process starts with uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) enriched to 60% U-235. Iran reportedly had around 400 kg, according to the NYT reporting cited by Faytuks.
2. Centrifuge Cascades To raise the enrichment from 60% to 90%, you’d need:
   • Fewer centrifuges than earlier stages.
   • Possibly 1–2 cascades of ~160–200 IR-6 machines could do the job in 2–3 weeks, depending on efficiency and operational runtime.
3. Product Output Assuming no material losses, you could produce around 25–35 kg of 90% enriched uranium—enough for at least one nuclear weapon, depending on the design and engineering.
4. Technical Considerations
   • The SWU cost for this enrichment step is modest: ~25–30 SWU per kg of 90% product.
   • The tails assay (waste enrichment level) would likely be adjusted to optimize throughput and limit material loss—typically ~10–20% in this phase.

Strategic Implication

This is precisely why 60% stockpiles set off alarm bells: once a country has this material, the technical and time barrier to weapons-grade material shrinks dramatically.

Key Points:

• The SWU requirement for this enrichment step is ~25–30 per kg of 90% U-235.
• Enrichment is most SWU-efficient at higher levels; fewer centrifuges are needed per unit gain.
• Tails assay (leftover enrichment) is typically high in this final stage to reduce loss of valuable U-235, which is why most of the original 400 kg ends up in the tails.
• The timeline is short: a few weeks or less, assuming operational centrifuge cascades.