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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA No. 18CR3677-W

Plaintiff,

ORDER EXCLUDING TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

DUNCAN D. HUNTER, (1) MARGARET E. HUNTÉR, (2)

Defendants.

The Court has read and considered the Joint Motion to Exclude Time Under the Speedy Trial Act, filed by the parties in this matter on December 6, 2018. The Court hereby finds that the Motion, which this Court incorporates by reference into this Order, demonstrates facts that provide good cause for a finding of excludable time pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3167.

The Court further finds that: (i) the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendants in a speedy trial; (ii) failure to grant the continuance would be likely to make a continuation of the proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice; and (iii) failure to grant the continuance would unreasonably deny defendants continuity of counsel and would deny defense counsel the reasonable time 28 necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

THEREFORE, FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, the time period of December 3, 2018 to September 10, 2019, inclusive, is excluded in computing the time within which the trial must commence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), (B)(i), and (B)(iv).

Nothing in this Order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods be excluded from the period within which trial must commence. Moreover, the same provisions and/or other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act may in the future authorize the exclusion of additional time periods from the period within which trial must commence.

DATED: 12/6/18

THOMAS J. WHELAN United States District Judge